


Strategy Research Project

Transformation...Was it Worth it

by

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United States Army



United States Army War College
Class of 2012

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

TRANSFORMATION...WAS IT WORTH IT

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ABSTRACT

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TRANSFORMATION...WAS IT WORTH IT

We are almost ten years removed from the Army making its most significant structural changes since World War II. The current transformation process resulted in changes to how the Army trained, promoted, equipped, and fought in war. In analyzing if the effort to transform was worthwhile, this research paper will discuss first, how the Army was structured; second, why and how the Army changed; third, what were the results; and finally, if this process achieved its goals. In conclusion, the author will discuss potential options for the way ahead as the Army continues to review this formation in an ever changing, resource-constrained environment.

The Way We Were

Prior to 2003, the year the Army officially began organizing in modular brigades, the focal point for Army formations was the division. The division basically comprised three maneuver brigades, a Division Artillery, a Division Support Command, an Aviation Brigade, Engineer and/or Military Police Brigades, separate battalions (such as Military Intelligence and personnel), and the division headquarters. These brigades were generally pure organizations. For example, the maneuver brigade had three maneuver battalions, and the Division Artillery had three field artillery battalions. The responsibility of the support brigades was to train their subordinate organizations to operate effectively when attached to the maneuver brigade they supported. Once attached, the maneuver brigade would focus on the higher level training tasks to ensure each element was a valued and integral asset to facilitate that brigade's mission. The parent support brigades would continually supervise this process to ensure their elements were meeting expectations. Additionally, the parent brigade was responsible for the

personnel and administrative actions to ensure the element they were giving the supported brigade was fit.

The division headquarters was responsible for all the brigades. In order to perform its wartime missions, liaison elements from each of the supporting brigades were attached to the division headquarters to facilitate planning, execution, and oversight. Although this purity was useful in a garrison/training environment, there was complexity in organizing for combat. Each separate unit had different identification codes, had a separate chain of command, and was supported through separate means. For an Army that was to be expeditionary, these complexities were difficult to manage.

Beginning in 1994, with the assembly of Task Force XXI, the Army began to look at ways to re-organize in an effort to meet the challenges of the future. Events that would unfold expedited this process and began the Army Transformation.

Why and How the Army Changed

In an effort to confront the attacks on 9/11, President George W. Bush called for sweeping changes in national security to harden our defenses. As published in a White House fact sheet on the policy, the President's intent was to transform our military to become better trained, equipped, and prepared for these threats.¹ As William Donnelly stated in his book, *Transforming an Army at War*, the ability to deploy a force of expandable Army elements, capable of being tailored to adjust to any mission or requirement began with Task Force XXI in 1994. Although there had been some adjustments, in 2001, then Secretary Rumsfeld did not feel the process was progressing quickly enough or with the correct focus.² He believed the Army was still a Cold War force in a Post Cold War era and that it was not structured appropriately to deal with the challenges ahead. The attacks of 9/11 demanded an expedited effort. Mr. Rumsfeld felt

it was still too mired in legacy views and wanted a greater application of digitization, precision munitions, and command and intelligence systems. In pursuit of those ends, he established the Office of Force Transformation in 2001 to push the services to examine new ideas.³ When General Shinseki's term as Army Chief of Staff ended in 2003, the secretary selected a former Special Forces officer, out of retirement, to become the new Army Chief of Staff. Although revisions and experiments in transformation were conducted, it was not until 2003 the Army truly began the process in earnest.⁴

General Schoomaker had two advantages as he began the process of transformation. First, he knew he would have the support of the secretary to make quick, large, and over-arching change. Second, from 1994 to 2001 there had been an extensive amount of work done on analyzing modularity. This experience and lessons learned for the planners would enable faster implementation of a policy.⁵ By 2003, the Army relied on unit deployments vice individual replacements to fill personnel needs. This was a lesson from Vietnam. Since most deployments involved brigade-size elements, the brigade instead of the division became the main element for planning force requirements. The modular brigade or BCT would be the focus of this design because it was flexible, could be dictated in structure by mission type, could provide better support for current operations, and would facilitate quick reaction for the Army to execute special requirements from regional commands.⁶

GEN Schoomaker's concern was that the institutional Army would resist the transformation and drag its feet to slow the implementation of the new programs and structures. To bypass that obstacle, he directed Training and Doctrine Command to

form Task Force Modularity.⁷ This element would be composed of retired and active duty personnel from around the Army and the joint force with a wide range of specialties including logistics, personnel, acquisition, and technology. They would operate their force development project in a “close-hold” environment.⁸ He wanted to prevent separate branches from stifling the project, thinking they would only view the recommendations from their own perspective and not what was best for the Army. Branch commandants did not get their first briefings until the initial design was complete.⁹ Also, he had the 3rd Infantry Division work on the heavy design, independently from the task force, to create another perspective from a division on the ground. This effort was eventually rejected. He did, however, have the task force make contact with regional commands to ensure they were meeting the requirements of those organizations while integrating with the joint force. He hoped that keeping these elements informed would facilitate support for the results.¹⁰ GEN Schoomaker’s goal was to create change quickly. He knew there would have to be some adjustments later, but greater change immediately would be better than a perfect solution too late.

Doctor John Bonin, who worked as part of the task force, later stated that friction arose from this process due to the speed and environment in which it was enacted. Despite the design that was being formulated, the stress of simultaneous wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had commanders on the ground asking for more BCTs. There was a need for more ground troops now.¹¹ Since GEN Schoomaker never intended this would be a perfect solution, the new BCTs began joining the fight immediately, most transforming as they began their training for re-deployment. The proposed structure and number of BCTs did not attain what many had recommended. However, the new

organizational structure was designed to facilitate joint operations, react faster, and better anticipate operational changes by flattening the organization.¹² It was a BCT that was larger, had many capabilities that were formally held at the division, had increased staff with new specialties, and had an increased potential in intelligence, analysis, and digitization.

What Were the Results

The Army created three types of BCTs. Stryker units comprised four maneuver battalions, an artillery battalion, and a support battalion. Heavy and light BCTs contained two maneuver battalions, a field artillery battalion, a reconnaissance battalion, a support battalion, and a special troops battalion. The division headquarters grew as former support headquarters were integrated into the staff as enablers. However, the division no longer had set responsibility over the brigades. The Divisions, as with the BCTs, were a “plug and play” structures, not necessarily related to one another even if wearing the same shoulder patch. Certain support units, such as the Division Artillery and supporting battalions, Military Intelligence battalions, and personnel battalions, were eliminated in an effort to create the desired number of maneuver BCTs.

Unfortunately, this transformation occurred when the Army was engaged in combat operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The transformation was in many respects a triumph, but in others a disappointment. The Army created several new BCT-sized organizations that could be put in the fight immediately. However, it kept most of the higher headquarters structure (divisions and corps) and did not achieve the goal of flattening the organization as was originally intended. Although currently on the ground the Army continues to be successful at the tactical level, combat operations have shown that the current BCT structure is not sufficient to meet all the future

operational requirements listed in the defense policy documents. There are fewer maneuver units, a lack of functional capability, a need for higher level oversight, and joint capability has not been sufficiently expanded.

Laws of the Fifth Discipline

Despite issues with the design, did transformation achieve its goals, and is the current BCT model the force structure the Army needs for the future? The Army prides itself on being a learning organization. In doing so, it reviews and conducts after action reviews on all its practices. Peter Singe's Laws of the Fifth Discipline are an effective way to analyze if this process achieved its objectives. Those laws are:

- 1) Today's problems come from yesterday's solutions
- 2) The harder you push, the harder the system pushes back
- 3) Behavior grows better before it grows worse
- 4) The easy way out usually leads back in
- 5) The cure can be worse than the disease
- 6) Faster is slower
- 7) Cause and effect are not closely related in time and space
- 8) Small changes can produce big results-but the areas of highest leverage are often the least obvious
- 9) You can have your cake and eat it too-but not at once
- 10) Dividing an elephant in half does not produce two small elephants
- 11) There is no blame¹³

1) *Today's Problems come from Yesterday's Solutions.* The Army made several organizational changes to create its modular structure. These adjustments required the

Army to balance its overall end strength based on the increase in the size of the BCT and resulted in greater operational costs.¹⁴ The re-structuring also eliminated several traditional units to accommodate the desired size of the force. Some example of units that disappeared from the former structure were Division Artilleries (all ten were removed leaving six field artillery brigades); Corps Support Groups and Division Sustainment Commands were consolidated into Sustainment Brigades; Personnel and Military Intelligence battalions were discontinued inside the division; Engineer and Air Defense battalions and brigades reduced overall; and one Infantry battalion in each brigade was converted to a much smaller reconnaissance battalion.

Current issues with the BCT design are: 1) the addition of a reconnaissance battalion at the expense of a maneuver battalion has hindered the abilities of the BCT to project combat power. 2) The discontinuation of many of the functional brigades (such as intelligence, artillery and engineer) to pay the bill for more BCTs has hindered the ability to operate across the full spectrum of operations. There is a loss of capability and training management. 3) The division headquarters provided a valuable function for its subordinate BCTs. This oversight is lacking in the modular design. 4) Improvement in joint integration has been minimal.

2) The Harder You Push, the Harder the System Pushes Back. As stated, GEN Schoomaker's concern was that the institutional Army would resist the transformation and drag its feet while implementing the new programs and structures. In bypassing this obstacle, he prevented traditional branches from influencing the development of the project. This created resentment in the branches that lost size, capability, and prestige. Additionally, formations deployed with the assets available, then reorganized to do what

was needed to accomplish the mission. The Army had executed transformation quickly, and due to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, was sending the organizations it had and not necessarily the organizations it needed. For example, with the reduction of an infantry battalion in each brigade, it became common practice for the BCTs to employ artillery battalions to conduct traditional maneuver missions. Similarly, due to terrain and population considerations, it was not unusual for units to be task organized to other brigades. Based on the need to manage effects in theatre, artillery brigade headquarters were mobilized and utilized in the role of the former Division Artillery. There was also a need for more engineer units to engage with improvised explosive devices, etc. These BCT issues gave credence to the view that the organization should push back against many of the changes. This structure had not enabled the maneuver commander with what was required. A harder push back would come from the organizations that lost capability.

Doctor Stephen J. Gerras describes a leader's responsibility for the climate of the organization in reviewing the 2004 Division Commander Study. "Strategic leaders have an inherent responsibility...leaders need to monitor and influence...facilitate organizational success and inspire subordinates to a lifetime of military service".¹⁵ The Leader-Member Exchange incurred by transformation enabled definite in and out groups. Due to the primacy of the BCT, those organizations clearly became the "in group." All others competed to be part of the overall organization. It became common for other functional brigades, lower in priority for personnel and equipment, to be deployed piecemeal and split accordingly to meet the needs on the ground. This experience produced displeasure with how the Army was newly structured. Training

oversight, personnel management, and opportunity for advancement are three issues that have been noted with transformation in the branches where these reductions have taken place.¹⁶ The Army is now conducting a review to determine what changes need to be made with transformation.

3) *Behavior Grows Better before it Grows Worse*. Define your own success, widen the aperture for branch qualification in DA PAM 600-3, and high promotion and retention rates to meet the needs of the force were personnel policies enacted to meet the requirements of transformation.¹⁷ However, this affected climate in the Army. “The Army Culture is out of balance...when selection opportunity gets too high; the competitive nature of the promotion system is diluted.”¹⁸

Meeting the personnel needs of an Army at war is critical. However, after ten years, it is time to review what the nation requires from its officer corps in the future. High promotion and retention rates are very popular initially; but in a competitive environment, if everyone gets the same prize the best officers will choose to leave the service and go to another organization. They want to compete and be rewarded on merit. Additionally, defining one’s own success does not fulfill the need to get a better position or faster promotion.

Several senior leaders have recently described an officer’s career path full of joint and interagency opportunities. In reality, those opportunities do not exist for many officers. Through many deployments and assignments, officers have a variety of valuable experiences. However, to receive joint credit an officer must serve in a designated JDAL billet or submit an arduous document detailing his/her experience to receive partial credit. It is quite possible two officers could serve in the same office with

one receiving joint credit and the other not. Either the ability to compete for these billets needs to be expanded, or the types of billets that receive credit needs to be reviewed.

4) *The Easy Way Out usually Leads Back in.* Not speaking with the commandants to receive branch input on transformation speeded the process. However, eventually those branches did get a vote on the results. If one looks at the structure of a brigade as it existed in 1994 at the start of Task Force XXI, one would realize that despite the robust staffs that were in place, a brigade has lost 26 percent of its combat power and actually requires more support to function.¹⁹ “In practice, modular means stand alone and these formations are not capable of independent operations inside a joint expeditionary force.”²⁰ Creating more brigades for deployment was a simplistic way to attack the problem the Army faced. That could have been achieved with much less hoopla by task organization under the current brigade structures that existed. The issue of brigade independent action needed an in-depth analysis of its ability to facilitate joint interoperability by reducing command structures and shortening the logistic tail to enable faster deployment and streamlined sustainment.

5) *The Cure can be Worse Than the Disease.* Short term benefits in a current, specific fight do not always yield the results needed to gain the overall capability desired. The fact that the Chief of Staff of the Army has decided to generate studies on leader development, manning the future force, and the Army as a profession, leads one to believe the organization may not be better off than it was prior to transformation. The current structure of “plug and play” brigades has led to some potentially critical future Army requirements. How did this cure become potentially worse than the disease?

Cultural blindness played a role in the conduct of transformation. The nation was involved in two simultaneous wars as it was about to begin this process. Ambiguity about the conduct or the length of the wars made it even more difficult. One would have to assume that decisions were made on best recommendations and personal experience. From this perspective and from the staff structure that was designed to create transformation, one could surmise that GEN Schoomaker's circumstance led to increased isolation of his advisors.²¹ Although our Army is the most effective in the world, one must conclude that it did not gain much from transformation. Ten years later, the pendulum has begun to swing back. The Army is worse off today in the categories of unit readiness, asset availability, training, and professional development than when it began the transformation process. It only increased the complexity of the situation. Transformation decreased the operational effectiveness along the full spectrum of war, and many organizations both in higher headquarters and in the field, diligently work to overcome these deficiencies. Training oversight and personnel management are issues being staffed right now. TRADOC is reviewing a proposal to put BCTs back under control of the division. There is recognition at all levels that adjustments to this policy must be made.

6) *Faster is Slower*. Transforming like building a plane in flight describes the urgency with which the Army went about this process. However, "there are physical aspects of flight to account for to ensure actual flight: lift, thrust, gravity and drag."²² Despite the tactical and operational struggles, the most difficult long term issue this transformation faced was the one constant (or gravity for the "in flight" comparison), the organization's culture.

To change a culture requires the use of embedding and reinforcing mechanisms. “Embedding mechanisms emplace the assumptions on the organization”...reinforcing mechanisms support them.²³ Embedding mechanisms GEN Schoomaker used were:

- 1) the primacy of transformation—speedy and unconventional
- 2) allocation of resources—limited time to have financial resources available
- 3) role modeling—special forces officers, smaller more agile and lethal
- 4) the design of the organization—wide range of personnel for the planning group, but limitations on input they could take
- 5) assertiveness—new chief of staff, coming off retired ranks.

All these factors played in how transformation was conducted and potentially why it is being reviewed at the Army level now.

7) Cause and Effect are not closely Related in Time and Space. “Leaders must look beyond near-term problems.”²⁴ Just because it may have solved an immediate problem does not mean it is the best organization for the future. The new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Martin Dempsey, has already signaled that there may be drastic changes to how we structure our future force. In a speech he gave to National Guard leaders, he describes being able to execute multiple contingencies at once; to better integration between the active, guard, and reserve forces; and to “reconsider, re-examine, re-articulate...and then resource” that force. His intent is to look beyond our current requirements and create a force that provides the “greatest number of options to our nation’s leaders.”²⁵

8) Small Changes can Produce Big Results-But the Areas of Highest Leverage are often the Least Obvious. In execution of transformation, decision making is the next variable to consider. Dr. Gerras describes this practice as the ability of a senior leader to empower subordinates, create “buy in,” and access more information against time available.²⁶ The 2010 Division Command lessons learned shows engineers, logistic, air defense, and aviation officers felt their capabilities were not utilized to fullest extent in the BCT- centric environment. In “Multinational Military Teams”, A.J. van Viliet and D. van Amelsfoort write about the importance of each sub group maintaining its own identity and that the key to effective planning and decision making is the integration of these divergent views.²⁷ Based on the current review of transformation and alternative strategies being developed, one is forced to believe there was not “buy in” that this structure was correct. New engineer battalions have already been activated. Additional command and functional area billets have been created. The Army is currently reviewing the reduction of BCTs to create additional infantry battalions and artillery batteries to provide the capability it needs. There is also a proposal to give each division a field artillery headquarters that can provide the division commander with a required asset and provide training and personnel oversight to its field artillery battalions.²⁸

9) You can have Your Cake and Eat It Too-But Not at Once. When most people outside the United States Army look at the organization, they see one branch of service. The Army, however, is made up of several branches all with their own histories, traditions, cultures, and competencies. The first aspect of this culture is team building or team leadership. Dr. Stephen J. Gerras and COL Murray Clark use a Team Leadership Model to describe this process. The inputs are the people (team composition as well as

culture and structure), the resources (money, equipment, time) and the task. In the process area is boundary spanning, decision making style of the team, type and level of communication and coordination, and norm setting. The outputs are team performance, satisfaction, innovation, and adaptability.²⁹

In examining Army transformation in this model, the task was clear; the BCT would be the organization. However, the resource and time portions of inputs in this design affected the intended results. The conceptual plan developed was not executed based on the competing facets of the financial constraints, the on-going wars, and the need for units to be able to affect the fight immediately. Commanders on the ground wanted more BCTs (combat troops) to meet current requirements.³⁰ It made the aspect of building BCTs seemingly more important than the original capability that was desired. Additionally, the process used to communicate and coordinate was limited. To prevent friction, General Schoomaker established a policy “of keeping information on the project from reaching the chief’s of Army branches and commandants of their schools.”³¹ He thought this would prevent these key leaders from stifling the results. The unintended consequences decreased the output of satisfaction, or the “failure to value individual satisfaction ... [that] can lead to decreased motivation and significant attrition of talent....”³² “Force structure determines training efficiency and leader mentorship.”³³ Low officer retention rates and fewer opportunities to command at the higher level were major issues discussed at the May 2011 Fires Conference at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Organizational changes influenced retention.

10) *Dividing and Elephant in Half Does not Produce Two Small Elephants.* At the end of the day it takes 100 guys to guard the FOB. The Army has created more

maneuver brigades, but the current BCTs are not large enough to sufficiently accomplish many mission sets. For example, during operation Iraqi Freedom, brigades from 3rd Infantry Division had to be supplemented in order to appropriately fight an enemy in an asymmetric environment. The result expanded BCTs from 3900 troops to greater than 5000.³⁴ This process was not unique. “As our commanders in the field repeatedly tell us, today’s battalions and brigades are too small for sustained combat or post-war security operations.”³⁵ However, brigades of over 5000 personnel are also too difficult for the current BCT staff to manage effectively.³⁶ The original model for transformation had these large formations commanded by a Brigadier General, with the appropriate staff to match.

11) *There is no Blame.* No one was trying to do wrong in this process. Everyone involved acted with the best intentions, and there was some benefit. Now is the time to truly get after the future force. In determining ethical considerations for this decision, it is important to use the structure identified by COL Lee DeRemer and to understand the culture that existed when these decisions were made in an effort to best evaluate this criteria.

David Burkus writes that despite written codes, people normally look to others for models of how to act.³⁷ It is then possible to assume that the culture many thought the new Chief espoused (small, light organizations) trumped some of the core values that they themselves held. In other words, they did not want to be disloyal to their boss. Instead, they rationalized recommendations and inputs to fit his vision. This was not a moral wrong, but an attempt to accomplish the task given the constraints. This reminds

us again of the Leader-Member Exchange and a desire to be in the “in group” as opposed to being an outsider.

Based on this analysis, an assumption of a fiscally constrained environment and in ensuring compliance with the requirements and tasks of the defense policy documents, this review of transformation suggests three possible options using the personnel and equipment available to gain the force capability needed based on current and future likely threats.

The Way Ahead

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) requires the military to: improve its flexibility and responsiveness; increase its counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism abilities; and retain the capability to fight our nation’s wars across the full spectrum of conflict.³⁸ The National Defense Strategy (NDS) describes guidance for force development to focus on irregular warfare, full spectrum operations, and to be agile, flexible, and increase joint capability.³⁹ The National Military Strategy (NMS) outlines in detail the shape of the future force for the land component as being versatile, joint, and capable of full spectrum and sustained operations.⁴⁰

OPTION I (Stay the Course, but with Adjustments). This process has created the greatest transformation in the Army since World War II. It has changed the way the Army promotes, trains, fights, and deploys to combat. It was conducted quickly and although tweaks have had to be made on the ground, the Army has been successful in prosecuting two wars while rotating units and gaining balance. The environment that has existed is changing. This organization should be built for the future requirements, not in response to specific issues generated based on the nuances of the current fight.

By addressing the issues given and by making adjustments to what is currently in existence, these changes can be done and stay within current budgetary constraints.

First, reduce the number of BCTs and give the remaining ones more capability. This will facilitate a third maneuver battalion in each BCT and increase engineer, artillery, and logistic support as well. Additionally, this will enable programmed Deputy Commanding Officers as opposed to a qualified officer that arrives during deployment. It will also make the process for selecting brigade level key billets more selective, hence increasing the proficiency of the staff. Finally, a large cost savings will be gained by the reduction in numbers.

Second, as was done with intelligence officers, command-select the Division Engineer and the Chief of Fires in each division. Also, give them the formal authority for training and branch specific personnel oversight. This will facilitate the training and oversight required with the cost savings of a smaller and more effective brigade headquarters element. Additionally, create formal relationships with National Guard and Reserve organizations in the state in which a division is stationed. Much of our residual artillery, logistic, and engineer assets were placed in these formations. Develop that relationship so each division has a habitual training process so we are able to deploy as one force.

Third, formally align the brigades under their parent divisions. Overall training and personnel management will be reviewed by the division. Divisions will then be better suited to facilitate the joint relationships required in training and pre-deployment that will manifest themselves in better joint relationships when it fights. The tools at the

BCTs are resident to make joint operations work. Training is all that is required to get there.

OPTION II (Revamp the Pure Form). The original model for transformation is not what was enacted. In the original, these modular brigades were to be commanded by brigadier generals due to their expansive size and staff capability. A brigadier general would provide the insight and experience of already having commanded a brigade. Command select colonels to serve as his deputies to facilitate their professional development so when promoted they have the expertise required. Additionally, these formations maintained the third maneuver battalion and had more functional brigades (such as artillery and engineer) than what was fielded. Use the original form as a base document, but combine this review with the other services to increase efficiencies. There will be fewer elements, but the capability will be far greater.

Since 2001, all the services have gone through some type of transformation. None has attained the goal of creating the efficiency and cooperation that was originally intended. Transform the military services holistically, creating a true joint force. At a minimum the defense budget will be cut 450 billion dollars. A suitable and sustainable force must maximize the realities of our impending budget while meeting the demands set by the defense policy documents. All our services have some similar, specific functional areas that their personnel execute as part of their daily duties and core competencies. Analyze which of these skills are able to be translated and operate them jointly.⁴¹ Electronic warfare, radar, unmanned aircraft, logistics, and effects are examples.⁴² Start integrating these joint capabilities and experiences throughout an officer's career at a junior level with assignment to the modular structure. This will

spread joint experience throughout our ranks and increase our military's ability to work together across services. Currently, most officers do not have their first joint experience until they reach the rank of O-4, if they have a joint assignment at all. This would start the process much earlier and the increase in understanding would create a synergistic effect that would enhance our knowledge base across the services, facilitating an increase in joint capability.

As Douglas Macgregor discussed in his article on force design, there is an opportunity to take advantage of the modular structure that has been created and "increase its range of strategic options." This element would combine ground forces with strike, intelligence-surveillance and reconnaissance, and logistic capabilities from across the services and meet the original goal of flattening the organization. In addition, it would save between 100-150 billion dollars that could be used toward the national debt, to increase the number of functional brigades to one per division, or to incorporate into other operational concepts.⁴³

OPTION III (Traditional). The division structure and hierarchy should never have been transformed. All the issues addressed provide example of why this structure was used for fifty years. 1) The size of the brigade fit its mission. Reducing battalions to create more brigades simply forced units on the ground to either assume greater risk or task organize forces to meet the need. 2) Eliminating special functional brigades caused a reduction in ability across the full spectrum of conflict. Leaders from various branches have shown their acumen through ten years of conflict. If given the mission and the appropriate task organization, they can do an alternative mission if required. There was always a potential of 4-5 maneuver brigades in each division, they just

needed to be adjusted appropriately to suit the mission required. However, by eliminating the capability, the Army has hampered its ability to accomplish future missions that do not exactly replicate the current wars. 3) Alignment to a divisional headquarters proved to be a valuable asset to brigade commanders. It allowed brigades to focus on their fight and facilitated coordination, guidance, and command and control. If given a separate mission, the division could influence and augment the brigade with the requirements it needed. Additionally, it provided much needed oversight to commanders. It ensured training across branches was done to standard and personnel management was done with equity. 4) For joint capability the division can still act as a Joint Task Force headquarters when required and can enable brigades to transition to a more joint capable force with training.

Using what is in existence, going back to the former structure can be done quickly. Assuming the budget will be at pre 9/11 levels, this structure attains that end state. Much of what was used to build the additional brigades came from within the division. We can stand up functional brigades quickly. Since there will be a reduction in brigades, the manpower and equipment is available. The ability to revert to the divisional structure will allow the level of oversight currently lacking to be corrected. After ten years of transformation there are some items to be retained and many lessons learned. The increase in digital capability and staff/specialty at the brigade is an example. Limitations with the previous divisional model was never structure, but just appropriate task organization, education, joint linkage, and training. The divisional structure better facilitates the joint capabilities we need for the future. The Army was

always a modular force. Task organization was a common requirement, and even with the current modular based organization, units task organize to do what is required.

Recommendation

Recommend OPTION II is selected and request the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs with the Secretary of Defense to enact a holistic change in how we structure as a military. There will be keen efficiencies monetarily in this process, and the military will be better suited for future engagements. Alignment of these organizations across regional commands will facilitate true joint relationships. The division headquarters should be transformed to a three star JTF headquarters under the regional commands with deputy two stars to enable appropriate oversight of these modular task forces.⁴⁴ Forces Command still retains authority to use these elements across theatres. Certain institutional requirements can be combined across services for like skill training for future savings.

OPTIONS I and III do not fix the joint issue. OPTION I is for the modular concept, but the current model has too many limitations. OPTION III opposed modularity, but the division model does not provide enough capability to the brigade. To use the division model one must employ parts of the division with a brigade to be successful. Although both stay within current budget, neither are suitable options to meet the needs of the defense policy documents if there is a larger than expected reduction in budget. It is clear both would be hampered if there is a reduction. The only solution would be to become smaller, hence reducing capability and flexibility. OPTION II meets all needs, gives flexible, budgetary considerations and is the only option that truly captures the intent of the increasing joint capability required in the future. Buy-in to this policy could be expected from the other services. The Air Force and Navy would

recoup structure lost over the last ten years and create more potential billets in a joint force. The Marines, who will likely also have to reduce force structure with budgetary cuts, would regain some positions via the joint task forces created. Since 1986, no service has really embraced Goldwater-Nichols. This policy would put the Army at the forefront and gives it legitimacy in determining how the military moves forward.

Endnotes

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⁷ Ibid., 24.

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